Anthony CORBEILL Grammatical Constructions We Live By: The Case of (dis)similis sui

In Republican Latin, when the adjective similis ("similar") denotes a general similarity it governs a dative; so dogs resemble wolves (Cic. nat. 1.97: canis ... similis lupo). When closer resemblance or identification is marked, the genitive is used; so veri simile is an invariable expression. With Livy, both constructions interchange freely (3.46.4: similibus ... Icili; 3.65.9: similes Icilio), until in the empire the genitive construction becomes uncommon. I wish to analyze these changes by focusing on the peculiar construction of similis sui/sibi, the case of self-resemblance. What seems an unremarkable instance of shifting case usage in fact parallels changing perceptions of moral character in the early Empire.

The phrase similis sui describes an object in nature that possesses an inherent resemblance to itself. I begin explicating this apparent tautology--how can something not resemble itself?--with a passage in which Cicero narrates human degeneration from natural law. He remarks that, were it not for moral depravity, "no one would be so like himself (sui ... similis) as all people would be like one another" (leg. 1.29). Universal self-similarity, in other words, coincides with an all-moral state of nature. The conception seems uniquely Roman. In texts otherwise indebted to Greek predecessors, formulations of the type similis sui do not translate a specific phrase. In these contexts, the Latin describes an unchanging state that inheres in nature (Cic. Tim., Apul. mund.) or, by analogy, geographical features, the properly running state, and the well-ordered soul (Mela; Apul. mund.; Cic. sen., Tusc.).

When applied to a human being, extant examples of the phrase (dis)similis sui reflect this notion of immutable nature. The identification noted is between current behavior and an assumed pre-existing pattern. Late Republican texts present the clearest examples, a circumstance that does not simply reflect the paucity of evidence. These passages demonstrate that retaining one’s true self became a matter of pride, provided that that self is worth attaining (e.g., Caes. apud Cic. Att. 9.16.2). Not surprisingly, this topos of unvaried character finds a comfortable home in Roman oratory (Cic. Clu. 41; cf. Ver. 2.4.15, Phil. 9.6).

In the Empire, the equation of external appearance and internal character becomes problematized, as actors grow increasingly capable of impersonating similis sui, of dis-simulating. Only two post-Republican examples of the phrase similis sui in describing a person’s character are extant. In both instances (Apul. met. 10.27; Suet. Tib. 67.3), the only individuals attaining the Republican ideal of self-resemblance are--ironically--innate masters of dissemblance.

I close with Seneca’s laments over how human beings have failed to live in accordance with natural disposition. In one case similis governs the dative sibi rather than the genitive sui (ep. 120.21). Kühner-Stegmann claim that "the genitive is used by Cicero and older authors when it is a matter of an all-around, comprehensive resemblance ..., while the dative is used only for partial or approximate similarity" (1.449; L.-H.-S. 78). Seneca, I claim, preserves in his remarks the connotations of the dative recognized in earlier authors. The evolution of the construction of similis sui/sibi represents, then, not simply a shifting of grammatical construction, but an instance where a new understanding of the world determines grammar.