Steven Lowenstam  Love or Desire: erôs in Plato

Although the whole interpretation of works like PlatoÌs Symposium and Phaedrus depends on how one defines the key term erôs, almost no attention has been paid to the fact that there is no unanimity on how to construe this word and, what is even more surprising, critics rarely acknowledge their disagreement.  LSJ, followed by nearly all translations of the Symposium, defines erôs as 'love'; others, including K.J. Dover (1980) and Anne Carson (1986), maintain that the word denotes 'desire.'  Gregory Vlastos (1981) is typical in his glossing over of meanings:  although he defines erôs as 'desire, longing,' he systematically translates the word as 'love' in his discussion of the Symposium.

It might seem obvious in the abstract, but concrete instances repeatedly remind us that the more attention we devote to PlatoÌs use of individual words, the more aware we are that such scrutiny is indispensable. Therefore, since there is a fundamental difference between loving and desiring a person or thing, any analysis of the Symposium and Phaedrus must be predicated on an understanding of the semantic sphere of erôs.   This paper reviews some pre-Platonic and Platonic passages and comes to the following conclusions:  initially, in the Homeric and Archaic Periods, erôs denoted 'desire, appetite.'  When epithumia entered the Greek language in the late Sixth Century, B.C.E., and, following KurylowiczÌs Fourth Law, arrogated the main functions of the older word, erôs itself was relegated to the more limited, secondary function of denoting only very strong desires, the most obvious being sexual.  The present survey indicates that the translation of erôs as 'love' is never appropriate in Archaic, Classical, or Hellenistic Greek; erôs always denotes a need or deficiency.

The implications of this word study are crucial to the interpretation of the Symposium.  When Socrates avers that his only knowledge is ta erôtika, he is not claiming any positive knowledge but is stressing his yearning for the wisdom he lacks.  Further, when he refutes Agathon, he is not arguing that people love their sweethearts only when they are absent but that they miss and desire them when they are apart.  The Symposium itself questions what humans want.  Socrates responds that we yearn (eran) for that complete wisdom that we can never retain on a permanent basis.