David
G. SMITH Acting
the Fools: Thucydides on the Dramatic Origins of the Sicilian
Expedition
In the opening chapter of his sixth book,
Thucydides claims, “At the start of the Sicilian expedition,
most Athenians were apeiroi both of the extent of the island they were
about to attack and of its Greek and barbarian inhabitants.” Although this statement is
often taken to be true, upon closer inspection it proves to be one of
the most easily disproven statements made by the historian otherwise
known for the reliability of his facts.
This paper first demonstrates the tenuous
veracity of Thucydides’ claim by presenting a survey of
evidence which (taken together) indicates that the Athenians were
actually quite well informed about the lands and peoples of Sicily in
415. In fact, it is
clear that Athens had sent hundreds and perhaps thousands of its
citizens to Sicily in a variety of capacities: ever since the Persian
War, Athens had continual diplomatic and (after the 430's) military
contact with both Greek states and non-Greek peoples in Sicily (by
Thucydides’ own account, sixty boatlo ads of Athenians fought
with Sicilian Greeks and natives from 427 to 424); in addition,
Athenians could not have failed to note and learn from the presence
of merchants, traders, and such highly visible and influential
Sicilian visitors as Gorgias and Lysias. Given that these types of contact involved public
meeting and discussion in the assembly and elsewhere, there can be no
doubt that a large amount of both first and second-hand information
about Sicily and its peoples was circulating among the Athenians at
the very moment when Thucydides accuses them of being apeiroi.
What, then, are we to make of Thucydides’
claim? This paper proceeds to explore the historian’s
motives for making such an easily disproven statement. Recent work has suggested
that Thucydides’ treatment of the Sicilian expedition is a part
of a wider elite attack on democratic modes of knowledge (Morris
1996, Ober 1998). It is exactly this type of
uncontrolled, public dissemination of information to which Thucydides
is referring when he claims that the Athenians are apeiroi. In
other words, what makes Thucydides call the Athenians ignorant of
Sicily is not the actual state or amount of their knowledge, but the
haphazard and indiscriminate manner in which they have come to know. For the Athenians very
precisely have NOT learned about Sicily from reliable authorities on
the subject (e.g. Thucydid es’ own likely source, Antiochus),
but from each other in the agora, the stoa, and the assembly.
Just as, even now, the citing of journals is more respected
than the citing of web pages, so the horizontal dissemination of
information under democratic control at the end of the fifth century
was disparaged as a source of true knowledge by elite Athenian
intellectuals such as Thucydides.
Finally, this paper reveals what must have
been, for Thucydides, the most dangerous possible source of
(mis)information about Sicily: the dramatic stage.
For indeed, the same Athenian citizens who were exchanging
information in the assembly and on the streets had been bombarded for
decades by the dramatic poets with bits of information about the
peoples, places, flora, fauna, my ths, legends, and history of
Sicily. This phenomenon
started with Aeschylus (whose autopsy had made him a ‘vir
utique Siculus’) and
continued all the way down through Aristophanes’ early comedies
to Euripides’ Troades, produced just weeks before the departure
of the Sicilian Expedition. In
the extant dramatic passages which mention Sicily, the same types of
themes reoccur over and over again: the fertility of its land, the
number and variety of its peoples, its position in relation to
Carthage and Italy, etc. It is, therefore, highly
significant that these are the same themes around which Thucydides
builds the rhetoric of the debate between Nicias and Alcibiades over
whether or not to attack Sicily.
By twisting the dramatic topoi about Sicily generated over decades in
front of dramatic audiences into the rhetorical topoi manipulated by the Athenian elite in front
of the assembly, the historian indicates his mistrust of the public
knowledge base. By
retracing how these dramatic commonplaces about Sicily became the
rhetorical basis for invading it, we can see why the quintessentially
democratic formation of knowledge was, for Thucydides, no knowledge
at all.
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