Sarah
BOLMARCICH Thucydides and the Constraints of
Hegemony
In
post-Cold War international relations theory, realist
theories that focused on the bipolar nature of the Cold
War and correspondingly drew upon Thucydides as a model
(e. g., Gilpin 1981) are now joined by theories that
question such paradigms as bipolarism
(e. g., Neumann 1996; Knutsen
1997), or by classical scholarship that seeks a
non-realist or non-bipolar model of international
relations in Thucydides (Connor 1991; Crane 1998; Hornblower
2000; van Wees 2000).
This same tension exists as well in Thucydides, and
examination of this tension is helpful in understanding
the challenges of hegemony for the hegemon.
This paper argues that models for international relations in an
hegemonic world, and specifically motives for hegemonic
behavior beyond the desire for power, can be found in
Thucydidesí interest in the Athenian Empire
alongside models for realist theory.
This
tension is captured in the Athenian apologia for
empire delivered to the Spartans at Thuc.
1.75-76. The
passage emphasizes the natural human desire for power
(and its exercise) and for security, motives that realist
theorists attributed to states, especially in a bipolar
system (respectively, Morgenthau
1949; Waltz 1979). Yet
this passage also has the Athenians explaining why, in
the face of worldwide opposition, unpopularity, and
impending war, they feel constrained if not forced (katēnagkasthēmen,
1.75.3; nikēthentes,
1.76.2) by ìfear, honor, and advantageî
to maintain their empire. It
is usually assumed that by ìfearî the
Athenians mean fear of Persia,
by ìhonorî honor from the other Greeks, and
by ìadvantageî financial advantage from the
payment of tribute. That
is, all three motives for maintaining empire relate to
Athenian interests and goals only, and so are in keeping
with the tone of the rest of the speech, with its focus
on the acquisition of power as an aspect of human nature.
But
ìfear, honor, and usefulness [a better
translation here in the absence of any specific financial
context]î inherently involve others, and so
adhere to some sort of shared ethical code while human
nature does not. Thucydides
in fact combines a realist perspective with a focus on
ethics (Forde 1992).
All three motives for empire can be found throughout the
history of Greek international relations: e. g., the
Spartans go to war with Athens
because of fear (Thuc. 1.23.6);
Sparta
claimed to go to war with Elis
in 402 to avenge her honor; and ōphelia
was something parties to a Greek treaty expected of one
another. They thus
should not necessarily be taken as part of
Thucydidesí realist theories about power and human
nature, also expressed in this passage.
In this context, it is significant that such motives as fear
are associated not with human nature but with the idea of
constraint (Thuc. 1.23.6,
1.75.3), attributing the desire to acquire power and to
be safe to the internal motive of human nature and the
desire to maintain power or to respond to
anotherís exercise of power to externally
determined motives such as fear of others or desire for
honor (granted by others) or the agreement to help
others.
Recognition
of the distinction that Thucydides draws in this passage
between internal motivation and external constraint can
help analysis of modern international relations.
Hegemons do not necessarily act from
internal constraint alone, whether it be
desire for power or the pressure of domestic politics.
Recent international relations theory views the international
system as an interconnected society of sorts (Hartmann
and Heuser 2000).
As such, social pressures can be brought to bear on a hegemon,
however powerful, and perhaps used to control her.
The pressure of fear, honor, and usefulness brought to bear on
Athens
drove her to seek more power and security via empire.
As the United
States
faces a similar situation ñ worldwide unpopularity
and opposition, and attacks on American interests
ñ it too may grasp for more power instead of
surrendering it. Thucydidesí
focus was as much on empire and hegemony as it was on
bipolarity, and so he is still useful today in
international relations theory.
Abstracts
Index