Phil CORKUM Aristotle
on Consciousness
Aristotle
sometimes draws analogies between perceiving and
thinking. In this paper, I'll argue that the role of the
active intellect in thought is analogous to the role of
perceiving that we see and hear in perception. The paper
comes in two parts. In the first part, I'll rehearse an
argument for the conclusion that perceiving that we see
and hear isn't the office of a faculty separate from the
special senses of seeing and hearing: rather, perceiving
that we see and hear is a turning of one's attention to
the affection of the sense organs. Drawing the analogy
with perceiving that we see and hear, I'll argue in the
second part of the essay that the agent intellect isn't a
faculty separate from the passive intellect. Rather, the
activity of the active intellect is a of turning of one's
attention to the intelligible objects contained in the
passive intellect. The activity of the agent intellect
is, for Aristotle, a kind of consciousness. The picture
of Aristotle's account of consciousness which emerges
from the argument of this paper suggests comparison
between Aristotle and a contemporary view of
consciousness as a higher-order representation. I'll urge
for caution in making this comparison.
Abstracts
Index