Malcolm HEATH What's
wrong with formalism, and why is it so useful?
Text is distinguished by an expectation of meaning,
typically grounded in the recognition that the text is a
product of meaningful action. But meaning does not exist
independently of an interest that determines an
interpretative practice. Specifying a meaning provides an
answer to the question 'what does this mean?', but there
are many different questions that may be asked in that
form. So the locus of meaning (and of textual effects
mediated by meaning) is not text, but the text-reception
complex: text is not an autonomous object of
interpretation, but is partially constituted by
interpretation. Consequently, formalism (that is, any
interpretative practice that appeals to text as an
autonomous source of meaning) is theoretically
flawed. However, I shall argue that it is possible to
mount a qualified defence of formalist
practice.
A paradigmatically formalist concept, unity, provides
an illustration. Unity has a regulative function in
interpretation: we expect unity, and interpretation is
guided by this presumption. The fact that a seemingly
formal feature is in this way constituted in
interpretation supports antiformalist theory. But despite
its regulative function, unity is not itself a norm:
rather, it designates an aspect of text that is subject
to norms. In expecting unity we expect coherence of
structure and/or content, but we do not expect the same
kind of coherence in all texts: substantive norms of
unity are generically and culturally
variable. Aristotle acknowledges the generic variability
of unity, but not its cultural variability. More
generally, although he sometimes draws attention to the
variability of audiences and their responses, he attaches
no positive significance to it in analysing poetic forms.
So his procedure is in a sense formalist, despite its
apparently nonformalist orientation to the audience. This
is not a paradox: reader-response criticism is formalist
if it treats ëthe reader' as a uniform and
essentially passive object on which the text works. Since
Aristotle's underlying interest is in philosophical
anthropology (not cultural history or literary criticism)
he can assume a universally normative audience. Such an
idealised audience, being effectively uniform, can be
held constant while differences in textual structure
and/or content are examined as if they were independent
sources of effect or meaning.
Aristotle's universalising approach is unlikely to be
shared today. But an analogous methodological defence of
formalist practice is possible. Achieving a manageable
level of complexity for analysis in the study of any
complex system requires bracketing out some variables. In
interpretation, it may be convenient to fix a model of
the audience: since the constitutive role of reception
has ceased to be a variable, textual structure and/or
content can then be treated as virtually autonomous.
Formalist practice is thus detached from formalist
theoretical commitments by an acknowledged idealisation.
This idealisation is arguably essential to any viable
nonformalist interpretative project.
Abstracts
Index