

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the vital importance of reading the methodological introduction to the cosmological speech in Plato's *Timaeus* (27c1-29d3) as directly engaged with the poem of Parmenides. It argues in particular that the statement made at *Timaeus* 29c3 that 'as *ousia* is to *genesis*, so *aletheia* is to *pistis*' is a direct allusion to Parmenides' use of the formula *pistis alethes* (DK 28B1.30, 8.28) and that this allusive reading solves many of the problems encountered with more traditional interpretations.

As has recently been noted (Johansen 2004, 50-51), 29c3 appears to suggest that 'truth' and 'belief' (about what comes to be) are mutually exclusive. Such a denial of the possibility of true belief must be reconciled with passages such as that at *Timaeus* 37b3-8 which quite clearly discusses the origin of such 'true beliefs' (*bebaioi kai aletheis doxai kai pisteis*). Johansen attempts to dissolve this conflict by suggesting that the truth of the beliefs about Becoming must be a qualified version of the truth *simpliciter* that is an attribute of accounts of Being. Such solutions are based on the erroneous assumption prevalent within literature on this passage i.e. that *pistis* in this context should be understood as 'belief' corresponding to the *doxa* of the Divided Line passage in Plato's *Republic* (Taylor 1967, 74; Cornford 1937, 23). The paper considers and rejects this suggestion on the grounds that an unfortunate consequence of taking the *pistis* of the *Timaeus* as equivalent to the *doxa* of the *Republic* is that the *aletheia* of the *Timaeus* must then be equivalent to the *episteme* of the *Republic*. This paper argues that such an equivalence should not be attributed to Plato, for whilst it is clear that the content of *episteme* is *necessarily* true, it cannot be correct to say that truth is *sufficient* for *episteme*, for such a claim only serves to undermine the possibility of true belief.

The paper demonstrates that *Timaeus* 29c3 is intended as a direct engagement with and indeed *correction* of the total condemnation of the beliefs of mortals ('in which there is no true trust') offered by Parmenides' goddess. In support of this suggestion it offers several further parallels between the two texts i.e. their shared interest in Being and Becoming and the epistemological states related to each ontological mode; their shared use of the vexed term *eikos/eoikos*; a common theme of 'forensic' rhetoric and judgement (including a contrast between the divine and human viewpoint). In the light of this relation, *pistis* at *Timaeus* 29c3 should be translated in the same fashion as at Parmenides B1.30 i.e. as an attribute of an account or proposition ('certainty' or 'conviction') rather than, as is traditional, as a term for an epistemological state ('belief').

The paper concludes that 29c3 does not make any claims about the potential truth status of human beliefs but, in fact, makes two fundamental points. The first is that the relationship between true accounts of being and convincing accounts of becoming is equivalent to the relationship between being and becoming described at the beginning of *Timaeus*' methodological speech (27d5-29b1) i.e. that they are 'proportional' (*ana logon*) in the same way as their subject-matter. The second is a rejection of the Parmenidean assumption that 'convincingness' is an objective quality that can only be possessed by the truth (*pistis alethes*) and is not in any way applicable to the false beliefs of humans. This rejection is made in favour of a recognition that, in practice, 'convincingness' is a subjective quality which is linked to truth in so far as what we find convincing is what we *believe* is true (or likely to be true) but is certainly not confined to truth. Indeed, it belongs more properly to the realm of subjective beliefs than to that of certain truths.