

A crucial application of Plato's views on the use of images in philosophy occurs through the use of the image relationship as an image for the relation of forms and particulars. The relation of a picture to the object it depicts, or that between a reflection and what it reflects, can be seen as analogous to the relation of a particular to the form in which it participates. Although the attack on the image model as analogous to the relation of forms and particulars in the *Parmenides* threatens to undermine any reliance on that model, this essay will present a case for reliance on the image model.

Forms, as discussed in the *Parmenides*, ought to explain why many things might resemble each other and might all deserve the same name. But if a sensible thing resembles some form as an image resembles its model, then a further form seems to be needed to explain that resemblance. This need for further forms continues to infinity, and thus the famous 'third man' regress seems to make the image model appear quite useless. This essay considers two especially promising responses to the regress problem, both of which deny that images truly resemble their models. On one reading, the sort of image to be considered is a reflection: since reflections are not substantial things at all, they cannot be said to resemble their models. Rather, the reflection is simply a resemblance of the model.

Although this view, focused on reflections as the paradigmatic images, is quite interesting, and although it accords well with the descriptions of the particular sensible things that appear in the receptacle in the *Timaeus*, the view should be rejected. This model cannot explain the independent motion of particular sensible things, a key point of disanalogy between reflections and particular sensible things. An alternate view would include more substantial images, but would insist that even these images do not resemble their models in any relevant respects. A drawn horse is not a horse at all—it does not resemble the horse with respect to being a horse. The only thing that could resemble a horse with respect to being an actual horse is another actual horse. Thus, images cannot be said to truly resemble their models, and the *Parmenides* regress cannot occur. On this model, it is not resemblance that justifies calling a particular thing after some form, but rather the fact that the particular thing embodies or instantiates some pattern dictated by the form. As an image makes manifest its model inasmuch as it is an image of the model, a particular thing manifests some form inasmuch as it instantiates the pattern dictated by that form. The image model, therefore, offers the best explanation of the relation of forms and particular things, and the image model resists the 'third man' regress voiced in the *Parmenides*.