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The Evidence of Χρή Against the Authenticity of the *Prometheus Vincetus*

This paper will examine the use and semantic range of χρή to provide further philological evidence that Aeschylus is not the author of the *Prometheus Vincetus*. I will show, using examples from both Aeschylus' corpus (*Supplices*, *Persae*, *Septem*, *Agamemnon*, *Choephoroi*, *Eumenides*) and the *Prometheus*, that the majority of uses of χρή in the *Prometheus* implies a source and type of necessity unlike that in the other six plays. This analysis of χρή would serve as a helpful addition to the results of Griffith's 1977 philological tests against the *Prometheus*' authenticity, primarily comprised of metrical analysis and including concerns such as the observation of the diaeresis, the length of periods, etc., but also devoting space to vocabulary studies. Since the arguments of Griffith (1977) and Herington (1970) consist mainly of the accumulation of minor lexical, stylistic, and metrical differences between the *Prometheus* and the other six, my study of χρή would be at home among the current evidence.

The primary difference between the use of χρή in the six plays and the *Prometheus* involves specificity: when, and to whom, the necessity of the χρή-statement is applicable. With respect to this the instances of χρή in all seven plays fall into two distinct groups. Examples of the first exhibit timelessly true proprieties and obligations, commonly known and affecting all mortals equally. These include the instances at *Supplices* 724-725 (χρή... μή ἀμελεῖν θεῶν), *Persae* 820 (οὐχ ὑπέρφεν θνητὸν ὄντα χρή φρονεῖν), and *Agamemnon* 928-929 (ὀλβίσι δὲ χρή / βίον τελευτήσαντ' ἐν εὐεστοῖ φίλῃ). Examples of the second group (usually translated "it is fated") include specific truths about the future, affecting a particular named person and known only to those with the relevant prophetic knowledge. These instances also assume a conception of the gods acting independently of, if not in fact at odds with, the source of necessity involved in the χρή-statement. As representative of this second group I will discuss *Prometheus* 703-704 (τὰ λοιπὰ νῦν ἀκούσαθ', οἷα χρή πάθῃ τλῆναι / πρὸς Ἥρας τήνδε τὴν νεάνιδα) and 714-715 (λαϊᾶς δὲ χειρὸς οἱ σιδηροτέκτονες / οἰκοῦσι Χάλυβες, οὐς φυλάξασθαί σε χρή), among others.

Examples of the first group can be found in all seven plays, and they make up the vast preponderance of uses in the first six plays, but examples of the second group are found almost solely in the *Prometheus*. I believe, as I will argue, that this remarkable departure in the usage and meaning of χρή from the six plays to the *Prometheus* provides additional evidence that Aeschylus is not the author of the *Prometheus*. I will also evaluate what relevance this analysis of χρή has for the dating of the *Prometheus* (Griffith 9-12; 252-254, 1977). The studies by Goodell, Benardete, and others show that the various words for necessity in Greek (χρή and δεῖ especially) share out the semantic field in different ways depending on time period; therefore, by comparing the use of χρή in the *Prometheus* with that of authors subsequent to Aeschylus, I will offer evidence that the use of χρή in the *Prometheus* is a later use. The relevance of the question cannot be understated, since, even thirty years after Griffith's groundbreaking study, there is no scholarly consensus as to the authorship of the *Prometheus*.